@conference {18588,
	title = {SCA-Resistance for AES: How Cheap Can We Go?},
	booktitle = {Progress in Cryptology {\textendash} AFRICACRYPT 2018},
	year = {2018},
	publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
	organization = {Springer International Publishing},
	address = {Cham},
	abstract = {This paper introduces a novel AES structure capable of improving the robustness against power analysis attacks while allowing for a very compact structure with a potentially negligible area and performance impact. The proposed design is based on a low entropy masking scheme, where half of the time the true value and half of the time the complemented value are used to mask the power consumption variation. The obtained experimental results suggest that the area overhead for the protection against power analysis is as low as 5{\%} LUT increase with a performance degradation of about 10{\%}. When compared with the state of the art supported on FPGAs, efficiency improvements above 6 times and a throughput improvement of at least two times higher are achieved.},
	isbn = {978-3-319-89339-6},
	author = {Chaves, Ricardo and Chmielewski, {\L}ukasz and Regazzoni, Francesco and Batina, Lejla},
	editor = {Joux, Antoine and Nitaj, Abderrahmane and Rachidi, Tajjeeddine}
}
@article {18554,
	title = {Securing Hardware Accelerators: a New Challenge for High-Level Synthesis},
	journal = {IEEE Embedded Systems Letters},
	volume = {3},
	issue = {10},
	year = {2018},
	month = {11/2017},
	pages = {77-80},
	chapter = {77},
	doi = {10.1109/LES.2017.2774800},
	author = {Pilato, Christian and Garg, Siddharth and Karri, Ramesh and Regazzoni, Francesco}
}
@conference {18584,
	title = {Security: The Dark Side of Approximate Computing?},
	booktitle = {Proceedings of the International Conference on Computer-Aided Design},
	year = {2018},
	month = {11/2018},
	publisher = {ACM},
	organization = {ACM},
	address = {New York, NY, USA},
	isbn = {978-1-4503-5950-4},
	doi = {10.1145/3240765.3243497},
	url = {http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/3240765.3243497},
	author = {Regazzoni, Francesco and Alippi, Cesare and Polian, Ilia}
}
@conference {18576,
	title = {Special Session Paper: Efficient Arithmetic for lattice-based Cryptography},
	booktitle = {Proceedings of the CODES+ISSS 2017},
	year = {2017},
	author = {O{\textquoteright}Sullivan, Elizabeth and Regazzoni, Francesco}
}
@conference {18489,
	title = {Secure architectures of future emerging cryptography},
	booktitle = {International Conference on Computing Frontiers CF{\textquoteright}16},
	series = {Proceedings of the ACM International Conference on Computing Frontiers},
	year = {2016},
	month = {05/2016},
	pages = {315-322},
	publisher = {ACM New York},
	organization = {ACM New York},
	address = {Como, italy},
	abstract = {Funded under the European Union{\textquoteright}s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme, SAFEcrypto will provide a new generation of practical, robust and physically secure post-quantum cryptographic solutions that ensure long-term security for future ICT systems, services and applications. The project will focus on the remarkably versatile field of Lattice-based cryptography as the source of computational hardness, and will deliver optimised public key security primitives for digital signatures and authentication, as well identity based encryption (IBE) and attribute based encryption (ABE). This will involve algorithmic and design optimisations, and implementations of lattice-based cryptographic schemes addressing cost, energy consumption, performance and physical robustness. As the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) prepares for the transition to a post-quantum cryptographic suite B, urging organisations that build systems and infrastructures that require long-term security to consider this transition in architectural designs; the SAFEcrypto project will provide Proof-of-concept demonstrators of schemes for three practical real-world case studies with long-term security requirements, in the application areas of satellite communications, network security and cloud. The goal is to affirm Lattice-based cryptography as an effective replacement for traditional number-theoretic public-key cryptography, by demonstrating that it can address the needs of resource-constrained embedded applications, such as mobile and battery-operated devices, and of real-time high performance applications for cloud and network management infrastructures},
	keywords = {identity based encryption, lattice-based cryptography, physical attacks, public-key cryptography},
	isbn = {978-1-4503-4128-8},
	doi = {10.1145/2903150.2907756},
	url = {http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2903150.2907756},
	author = {O{\textquoteright}Neill, Maire and O{\textquoteright}Sullivan, Elizabeth and McWilliams, Gavin and Saarinen, Markku-Juhani and Moore, Ciara and Khalid, Ayesha and Howe, James and Del Pino, Rafael and Abdalla, Michel and Regazzoni, Francesco and Valencia, Andres Felipe and G{\"u}neysu, Tim and Oder, Tobias and Waller, Adrian and Jones, Glyn and Barnett, Anthony and Griffin, Robert and Byrne, Andrew and Ammar, Bassem and Lund, David}
}
@conference {18487,
	title = {Standard lattices in hardware},
	booktitle = {Proceedings of the 53rd Annual Design Automation Conference DAC 2016},
	series = {Proceedings of DAC },
	year = {2016},
	month = {06/2016},
	pages = {162},
	publisher = {ACM},
	organization = {ACM},
	address = {Austin, TX, USA},
	abstract = {Lattice-based cryptography has gained credence recently as a replacement for current public-key cryptosystems, due to its quantum-resilience, versatility, and relatively low key sizes. To date, encryption based on the learning with errors (LWE) problem has only been investigated from an ideal lattice standpoint, due to its computation and size efficiencies. However, a thorough investigation of standard lattices in practice has yet to be considered. Standard lattices may be preferred to ideal lattices due to their stronger security assumptions and less restrictive parameter selection process.

In this paper, an area-optimised hardware architecture of a standard lattice-based cryptographic scheme is proposed. The design is implemented on a FPGA and it is found that both encryption and decryption fit comfortably on a Spartan-6 FPGA. This is the first hardware architecture for standard lattice-based cryptography reported in the literature to date, and thus is a benchmark for future implementations. Additionally, a revised discrete Gaussian sampler is proposed which is the fastest of its type to date, and also is the first to investigate the cost savings of implementing with λ/2-bits of precision.

Performance results are promising compared to the hardware designs of the equivalent ring-LWE scheme, which in addition to providing stronger security proofs; generate 1272 encryptions per second and 4395 decryptions per second.
},
	keywords = {encryption, hardware design, lattice-based cryptography, physical attack},
	isbn = {978-1-4503-4236-0},
	doi = {10.1145/2897937.2898037},
	url = {http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2897937.2898037},
	author = {Howe, James and Moore, Ciara and O{\textquoteright}Neill, Maire and Regazzoni, Francesco and G{\"u}neysu, Tim and Beeden, K.}
}
@conference {18462,
	title = {Security Challenges for Hardware Designers of Mobile Systems},
	booktitle = {2015 Mobile Systems Technologies Workshop (MST)},
	year = {2015},
	month = {May},
	keywords = {cryptographic capabilities, cryptographic primitives, cryptography, hardware, hardware design flow, hardware designers, hardware trojan, Hardware Trojans, Integrated optics, malware, mobile communication, mobile computing, mobile device, mobile devices, Mobile handsets, mobile systems, Optical device fabrication, pervasive mobile devices, physical attack, physical attacks, security, security challenges, software malware, telecommunication security, Trojan horses},
	doi = {10.1109/MST.2015.11},
	author = {Milosevic, Jelena and Ferrante, Alberto and Regazzoni, Francesco}
}
@conference {18360,
	title = {Simulation and Analysis of Negative-Bias Temperature Instability Aging on Power Analysis Attacks},
	booktitle = {IEEE Int. Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust},
	year = {2015},
	month = {05/2015},
	address = {McLean, VA, USA},
	author = {Guo, Xiaofei and Karimi, Nagmeh and Regazzoni, Francesco and Jin, Chenglu and Karri, Ramesh}
}
@conference {18476,
	title = {A survey on hardware trojan detection techniques},
	booktitle = {IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS) 2015},
	year = {2015},
	month = {08/2015},
	pages = {2021-2024},
	publisher = {IEEE},
	organization = {IEEE},
	edition = {2015},
	address = {Lisbon, Portugal},
	abstract = {Hardware Trojans recently emerged as a serious issue for computer systems, especially for those used in critical applications such as medical or military. Trojan proposed so far can affect the reliability of a device in various ways. Proposed effects range from the leakage of secret information to the complete malfunctioning of the device. A crucial point for securing the overall operation of a device is to guarantee the absence of hardware Trojans. In this paper, we survey several techniques for detecting malicious modification of circuit introduced at different phases of the design flow. We also highlight their capabilities limitations in thwarting hardware Trojans.},
	keywords = {hardware Trojan detection techniques, integrated circuit reliability},
	isbn = {978-1-4799-8391-9},
	issn = {0271-4302},
	doi = {10.1109/ISCAS.2015.7169073},
	url = {http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/mostRecentIssue.jsp?punumber=7152138},
	author = {Bhasin, Shivam and Regazzoni, Francesco}
}
@inbook {18065,
	title = {Security IPs and IP Security with FPGAs},
	booktitle = {Secure Smart Embedded Devices Platform and Applications},
	year = {2014},
	author = {Durvaux, Fran{\c c}ois and Kerckhof, St{\'e}phanie and Regazzoni, Francesco and Standaert, Fran{\c c}ois-Xavier},
	editor = {Markantonakis, Konstantinos}
}
@article {18467,
	title = {Simulation-Time Security Margin Assessment against Power-Based Side Channel Attacks},
	journal = {(IACR) Cryptology ePrint Archive},
	volume = {2014},
	year = {2014},
	month = {05/2014},
	chapter = {307},
	abstract = {A sound design time evaluation of the security of a digital device is a goal which has attracted a great amount of research effort lately. Common security metrics for the attack consider either the theoretical leakage of the device, or assume as a security metric the number of measurements needed in order to be able to always recover the secret key. In this work we provide a combined security metric taking into account the computational effort needed to lead the attack, in combination with the quantity of measurements to be performed, and provide a practical lower bound for the security margin which can be employed by a secure hardware designer. This paper represents a first exploration of a design-time security metric incorporating the computational effort required to lead a power- based side channel attack in the security level assessment of the device. We take into account in our metric the possible presence of masking and hiding schemes, and we assume the best measurement conditions for the attacker, thus leading to a conservative estimate of the security of the device. We provide a practical validation of our security metric through an analysis of transistor-level accurate power simulations of a 128-bit AES core implemented on a 65 nm library.},
	keywords = {AES, implementation, Side-channel analysis},
	author = {Barenghi, Alessandro and Pelosi, Gerardo and Regazzoni, Francesco}
}
@conference {18470,
	title = {Single-Photon Avalanche Diodes (SPADs) for quantum random number generators and beyond},
	booktitle = {19th Asia and South Pacific Design Automation Conference (ASP-DAC) 2014},
	year = {2014},
	month = {01/2014},
	publisher = {IEEE},
	organization = {IEEE},
	address = {Singapore},
	abstract = {Single-Photon Avalanche Diodes (SPADs) are solid-state photo-detectors capable of detecting single photons by exploiting the avalanche effect that occurs in the breakdown of a p-n junction biased above breakdown voltage. By this effect, a SPAD translates an incoming photon to a macroscopic current pulse. These devices are currently used for building medical devices characterized by a very high time resolution. An appealing application of SPAD is to use them as a basic block for building the entropy source of true random number generators. In this paper we focus on such application, and we explore the design challenges behind the realization of a quantum random number generator based on a massively parallel array of SPADs. The matrix under investigation comprises 512{\texttimes}128 independent cells that convert photons onto a raw bit-stream, which, as ensured by the properties of quantum physics, is characterized by a very high level of randomness. The sequences are read out in a 128-bit parallel bus, concatenated, and pipelined onto a de-biasing filter. Subsequently, we fabricated the proposed chip using a standard CMOS process. Our results, achieved on the manufactured device and coupling two matrices, show that our architecture can reach up to 5 Gbit/s while consuming 25pJ/bit, thus demonstrating scalability and performance for any random number generators based on SPADs},
	keywords = {quantum physics, random number generators, SPAD},
	isbn = {978-1-4799-2816-3},
	url = {http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/mostRecentIssue.jsp?punumber=6736726},
	author = {Regazzoni, Francesco and Burri, Samuel and Stucki, Damien and Maruyama, Yuki and Bruschini, Claudio and Charbon, Edoardo}
}
@article {18059,
	title = {Stealthy Dopant-Level Hardware Trojans: Extended Version},
	journal = {Journal of Cryptographic Engineering},
	volume = {4},
	issue = {1},
	year = {2014},
	month = {04/2014},
	pages = {19-31},
	abstract = {In recent years, hardware Trojans have drawn the attention of governments and industry as well as the scientific community. One of the main concerns is that integrated circuits, e.g., for military or critical-infrastructure applications, could be maliciously manipulated during the manufacturing process, which often takes place abroad. However, since there have been no reported hardware Trojans in practice yet, little is known about how such a Trojan would look like and how difficult it would be in practice to implement one. In this paper we propose an extremely stealthy approach for implementing hardware Trojans below the gate level, and we evaluate their impact on the security of the target device. Instead of adding additional circuitry to the target design, we insert our hardware Trojans by changing the dopant polarity of existing transistors. Since the modified circuit appears legitimate on all wiring layers (including all metal and polysilicon), our family of Trojans is resistant to most detection techniques, including fine-grain optical inspection and checking against {\textquotedblleft}golden chips{\textquotedblright}. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach by inserting Trojans into two designs{\textemdash}a digital post-processing derived from Intel{\textquoteright}s cryptographically secure RNG design used in the Ivy Bridge processors and a side-channel resistant SBox implementation{\textemdash}and by exploring their detectability and their effects on security.},
	keywords = {Hardware Trojans, Layout modifications, Malicious hardware, Trojan side-channel},
	issn = {2190-8516},
	doi = {10.1007/s13389-013-0068-0},
	author = {Becker, Georg and Regazzoni, Francesco and Paar, Christof and Burleson, Wayne}
}
@conference {18070,
	title = {Single-Photon Image Sensors},
	booktitle = {Special Session, 50th Design Automation Conference (DAC)},
	year = {2013},
	month = {June},
	address = {Austin, Texas, USA},
	author = {Charbon, Edoardo and Regazzoni, Francesco}
}
@conference {18066,
	title = {Sleuth: Automated Verification of Software Power Analysis Countermeasures},
	booktitle = {Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems (CHES)},
	year = {2013},
	month = {August},
	address = {Santa Barbara, California, USA},
	author = {Bayrak, Ali Galip and Regazzoni, Francesco and Novo Bruna, David and Ienne, Paolo}
}
@conference {18067,
	title = {Stealthy Dopant-Level Hardware Trojans},
	booktitle = {Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems (CHES)},
	year = {2013},
	month = {August},
	address = {Santa Barbara, California, USA},
	author = {Becker, Georg and Regazzoni, Francesco and Paar, Christof and Burleson, Wayne}
}
@conference {17577,
	title = {Security Enhanced Linux on Embedded Systems: a Hardware-accelerated Implementation},
	booktitle = {17th Asia and South Pacific Design Automation Conference, ASP-DAC 2012},
	year = {2012},
	month = {02/2012},
	address = {Sydney, Australia},
	abstract = {Security Enhanced Linux implements fine-grained mandatory access control. Despite its usefulness, the overhead of implementing it on embedded devices is prohibitive. Therefore, in the past it has been proposed to accelerate SELinux by means of dedicated hardware; in this work we demonstrate the feasibility of such an approach by implementing a hardware accelerator for SELinux on a FPGA-based platform. Our implementation obtains a huge reduction in the performance overhead and energy consumption of SELinux, yet employing a limited chip area.},
	keywords = {authorisation, dedicated hardware, embedded systems, energy consumption, field programmable gate arrays, fine-grained mandatory access control, FPGA-based platform, hardware accelerator, hardware-accelerated implementation, linux, performance overhead reduction, security enhanced Linux},
	doi = {10.1109/ASPDAC.2012.6164960},
	author = {Fiorin, Leandro and Ferrante, Alberto and Padarnitsas, Konstantinos and Regazzoni, Francesco}
}
@conference {18074,
	title = {Simulation-Time Security Margin Assessment against power-based Side Channel Attacks},
	booktitle = {7th Workshop on Embedded Systems Security (WESS)},
	year = {2012},
	month = {October},
	address = {Tampere, Finland},
	author = {Barenghi, Alessandro and Pelosi, Gerardo and Regazzoni, Francesco}
}
@conference {59.ReBaEi07,
	title = {Simulation-based Methodology for Evaluating DPA-Resistance of Cryptographic Functional Units with Application to CMOS and MCML Technologies},
	booktitle = {International Conference on Embedded Computer Systems: Architectures, Modeling, and Simulation (SAMOS IC 07)},
	year = {2007},
	month = {July 16-19},
	address = {Samos, Greece},
	abstract = {This paper explores the resistance of MOS Current Mode Logic (MCML) against Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attacks. Circuits implemented in MCML, in fact, have unique characteristics both in terms of power consumption and the dependency of the power profile from the input signal pattern. Therefore, MCML is suitable to protect cryptographic hardware from DPA and similar side-channel attacks. In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of different logic styles against power analysis attacks, the non-linear bijective function of the Kasumi algorithm (known as substitution box S7) was implemented with CMOS and MCML technology, and a set of attacks was performed using power traces derived from SPICE-level simulations. Although all keys were discovered for CMOS, only very few attacks to MCML were successful.},
	keywords = {current mode logic (CML), differential power analysis (DPA), power simulation, side channel attacks},
	author = {Regazzoni, Francesco and Badel, St{\'e}phane and Eisenbarth, Thomas and Gro{\ss}sch{\"a}dl, Johann and Poschmann, Axel and Toprak, Zeynep and Macchetti, Marco and Pozzi, Laura and Paar, Christof and Leblebici, Yusuf and Ienne, Paolo}
}
@conference {39.1169233,
	title = {Speeding Up AES By Extending a 32 bit Processor Instruction Set},
	booktitle = {ASAP {\textquoteright}06: Proceedings of the IEEE 17th International Conference on Application-specific Systems, Architectures and Processors (ASAP{\textquoteright}06)},
	year = {2006},
	pages = {275-282},
	publisher = {IEEE Computer Society},
	organization = {IEEE Computer Society},
	address = {Washington, DC, USA},
	abstract = {Nowadays the need of speed in cipher and decipher operations is more important than in the past. This is due to the diffusion of real time applications, which fact involves the use of cryptography. Many co-processors for cryptography were studied and presented in the past, but only few works were addressed to the enhancement of the instruction set architecture (ISA) of the embedded processor. This paper presents an extension of the ISA of a 32 bit processor, that aims at speeding up the software implementations of the AES algorithm. After the identification of the most frequently executed and the most time consuming sections of the algorithm, a set of dedicated instructions is designed in order to improve the performances of the cipher operations. We validate our instruction set extension by measuring the speed up for different optimized implementations of AES using an ARM processor simulator, but the enhancements we propose are general enough to be applied to almost all 32 bit processors.},
	keywords = {cryptography, HW/SW co-design, instruction set extension},
	isbn = {0-7695-2682-9},
	doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ASAP.2006.62},
	author = {Bertoni, Guido Marco and Breveglieri, Luca and Farina, Roberto and Regazzoni, Francesco}
}
@conference {29.SaMaRe2005,
	title = {Speeding Security on the Intel StrongARM},
	booktitle = {Embedded Intel Solutions},
	year = {2005},
	pages = {31-33},
	abstract = {With the increasing use of portable and wireless devices in the business and daily life, protecting sensitive information via encryption is becoming more and more crucial. ALaRI (Advanced Learning and Research Institute) has been conducting research aimed at improving the execution of security algorithms in embedded systems. Thanks to a donation from Intel, ALaRI has been able to develop several recommendations for implementing security efficiently on the Intel StrongARM architecture.},
	keywords = {embedded processors, instruction set extension, security},
	author = {Sami, Mariagiovanna and Macchetti, Marco and Regazzoni, Francesco}
}
