@conference {18462,
	title = {Security Challenges for Hardware Designers of Mobile Systems},
	booktitle = {2015 Mobile Systems Technologies Workshop (MST)},
	year = {2015},
	month = {May},
	keywords = {cryptographic capabilities, cryptographic primitives, cryptography, hardware, hardware design flow, hardware designers, hardware trojan, Hardware Trojans, Integrated optics, malware, mobile communication, mobile computing, mobile device, mobile devices, Mobile handsets, mobile systems, Optical device fabrication, pervasive mobile devices, physical attack, physical attacks, security, security challenges, software malware, telecommunication security, Trojan horses},
	doi = {10.1109/MST.2015.11},
	author = {Milosevic, Jelena and Ferrante, Alberto and Regazzoni, Francesco}
}
@article {18059,
	title = {Stealthy Dopant-Level Hardware Trojans: Extended Version},
	journal = {Journal of Cryptographic Engineering},
	volume = {4},
	issue = {1},
	year = {2014},
	month = {04/2014},
	pages = {19-31},
	abstract = {In recent years, hardware Trojans have drawn the attention of governments and industry as well as the scientific community. One of the main concerns is that integrated circuits, e.g., for military or critical-infrastructure applications, could be maliciously manipulated during the manufacturing process, which often takes place abroad. However, since there have been no reported hardware Trojans in practice yet, little is known about how such a Trojan would look like and how difficult it would be in practice to implement one. In this paper we propose an extremely stealthy approach for implementing hardware Trojans below the gate level, and we evaluate their impact on the security of the target device. Instead of adding additional circuitry to the target design, we insert our hardware Trojans by changing the dopant polarity of existing transistors. Since the modified circuit appears legitimate on all wiring layers (including all metal and polysilicon), our family of Trojans is resistant to most detection techniques, including fine-grain optical inspection and checking against {\textquotedblleft}golden chips{\textquotedblright}. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach by inserting Trojans into two designs{\textemdash}a digital post-processing derived from Intel{\textquoteright}s cryptographically secure RNG design used in the Ivy Bridge processors and a side-channel resistant SBox implementation{\textemdash}and by exploring their detectability and their effects on security.},
	keywords = {Hardware Trojans, Layout modifications, Malicious hardware, Trojan side-channel},
	issn = {2190-8516},
	doi = {10.1007/s13389-013-0068-0},
	author = {Becker, Georg and Regazzoni, Francesco and Paar, Christof and Burleson, Wayne}
}
