@article {18059,
	title = {Stealthy Dopant-Level Hardware Trojans: Extended Version},
	journal = {Journal of Cryptographic Engineering},
	volume = {4},
	issue = {1},
	year = {2014},
	month = {04/2014},
	pages = {19-31},
	abstract = {In recent years, hardware Trojans have drawn the attention of governments and industry as well as the scientific community. One of the main concerns is that integrated circuits, e.g., for military or critical-infrastructure applications, could be maliciously manipulated during the manufacturing process, which often takes place abroad. However, since there have been no reported hardware Trojans in practice yet, little is known about how such a Trojan would look like and how difficult it would be in practice to implement one. In this paper we propose an extremely stealthy approach for implementing hardware Trojans below the gate level, and we evaluate their impact on the security of the target device. Instead of adding additional circuitry to the target design, we insert our hardware Trojans by changing the dopant polarity of existing transistors. Since the modified circuit appears legitimate on all wiring layers (including all metal and polysilicon), our family of Trojans is resistant to most detection techniques, including fine-grain optical inspection and checking against {\textquotedblleft}golden chips{\textquotedblright}. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach by inserting Trojans into two designs{\textemdash}a digital post-processing derived from Intel{\textquoteright}s cryptographically secure RNG design used in the Ivy Bridge processors and a side-channel resistant SBox implementation{\textemdash}and by exploring their detectability and their effects on security.},
	keywords = {Hardware Trojans, Layout modifications, Malicious hardware, Trojan side-channel},
	issn = {2190-8516},
	doi = {10.1007/s13389-013-0068-0},
	author = {Becker, Georg and Regazzoni, Francesco and Paar, Christof and Burleson, Wayne}
}
@conference {18067,
	title = {Stealthy Dopant-Level Hardware Trojans},
	booktitle = {Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems (CHES)},
	year = {2013},
	month = {August},
	address = {Santa Barbara, California, USA},
	author = {Becker, Georg and Regazzoni, Francesco and Paar, Christof and Burleson, Wayne}
}
@article {18492,
	title = {Breaking ECC2K-130},
	journal = {IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive},
	volume = {2009},
	year = {2009},
	month = {11/2009},
	pages = {541},
	abstract = {Elliptic-curve cryptography is becoming the standard public-key primitive not only for mobile devices but also for high-security applications. Advantages are the higher cryptographic strength per bit in comparison with RSA and the higher speed in implementations. To improve understanding of the exact strength of the elliptic-curve discrete-logarithm problem, Certicom has published a series of challenges. This paper describes breaking the ECC2K-130 challenge using a parallelized version of Pollard{\textquoteright}s rho method. This is a major computation bringing together the contributions of several clusters of conventional computers, PlayStation~3 clusters, computers with powerful graphics cards and FPGAs. We also give /preseestimates for an ASIC design. In particular we present * our choice and analysis of the iteration function for the rho method; * our choice of finite field arithmetic and representation; * detailed descriptions of the implementations on a multitude of platforms: CPUs, Cells, GPUs, FPGAs, and ASICs; * details about running the attack. },
	keywords = {Attacks, automorphisms, binary fields, Certicom challenges, DLP, ECC, implementation, Koblitz curves, parallelized Pollard rho},
	url = {http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/541},
	author = {Bailey, Daniel V. and Batina, Lejla and Bernstein, Daniel J. and Birkner, Peter and Bos, Joppe W. and Chen, Hsieh - Chung and Cheng, Chen - Mou and van Damme, Gauthier and G{\"u}neysu, Tim and Gurkaynak, Frank and Kleinjung, Thorsten and Paar, Christof and Regazzoni, Francesco and Niederhagen, Ruben and Schwabe, Peter and Uhsadel, Leif and Van Herrewege, Anthony}
}
@conference {18084,
	title = {The Certicom Challenges ECC2-X},
	booktitle = {Workshop on Special Purpose Hardware for Attacking Cryptographic Systems (SHARCS)},
	year = {2009},
	month = {September},
	address = {Lausanne, Switzerland},
	author = {Bailey, Daniel V. and Baldwin, Brian and Batina, Lejla and Bernstein, Daniel J. and Birkner, Peter and Bos, Joppe W. and van Damme, Gauthier and de Meulenaer, Giacomo and Fan, Junfeng and Gurkaynak, Frank and G{\"u}neys, Tim and Kleinjung, Thorsten and Lange, Tanja and Mentens, Nele and Paar, Christof and Regazzoni, Francesco and Schwabe, Peter and Uhsadel, Leif}
}
@article {18064,
	title = {Evaluating Resistance of MCML Technology to Power Analysis Attacks Using a Simulation-Based Methodology},
	journal = {Springer Transactions on Computational Science},
	volume = {5430},
	year = {2009},
	month = {February},
	pages = {230{\textendash}243},
	author = {Regazzoni, Francesco and Eisenbarth, Thomas and Poschmann, Axel and Groschdl, Johann and Gurkaynak, Frank and Macchetti, Marco and Toprak, Zeynep and Pozzi, Laura and Paar, Christof and Leblebici, Yusuf and Ienne, Paolo}
}
@conference {67.ReEiGr07,
	title = {Power Attacks Resistance of Cryptographic S-boxes with added Error Detection Circuits},
	booktitle = {proceedings of: {\textquoteright}22nd IEEE International Symposium on Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI Systems (DFT{\textquoteright}07)},
	year = {2007},
	month = {September 26-28},
	address = {Rome, Italy},
	abstract = {Many side-channel attacks on implementations of cryptographic algorithms have been developed in recent years demonstrating the ease of extracting the secret key. In response, various schemes to protect cryptographic devices against such attacks have been devised and some implemented in practice. Almost all of these protection schemes target an individual side-channel attack and consequently, it is not obvious whether a scheme for protecting the device against one type of side-channel attacks may make the device more vulnerable to another type of side-channel attacks. We examine in this paper the possibility of such a negative impact for the case where fault detection circuitry is added to a device (to protect it against fault injection attacks) and analyze the resistance of the modified device to power attacks. To simplify the analysis we focus on only one component in the cryptographic device (namely, the S-box in the AES and Kasumi ciphers), and perform power attacks on the original implementation and on a modified implementation with an added parity check circuit. Our results show that the presence of the parity check circuitry has a negative impact on the resistance of the device to power analysis attacks.},
	keywords = {cryptography, fault tolerance, reliable applications, side channel attacks},
	author = {Regazzoni, Francesco and Eisenbarth, Thomas and Gro{\ss}sch{\"a}dl, Johann and Breveglieri, Luca and Ienne, Paolo and Koren, Israel and Paar, Christof}
}
@conference {59.ReBaEi07,
	title = {Simulation-based Methodology for Evaluating DPA-Resistance of Cryptographic Functional Units with Application to CMOS and MCML Technologies},
	booktitle = {International Conference on Embedded Computer Systems: Architectures, Modeling, and Simulation (SAMOS IC 07)},
	year = {2007},
	month = {July 16-19},
	address = {Samos, Greece},
	abstract = {This paper explores the resistance of MOS Current Mode Logic (MCML) against Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attacks. Circuits implemented in MCML, in fact, have unique characteristics both in terms of power consumption and the dependency of the power profile from the input signal pattern. Therefore, MCML is suitable to protect cryptographic hardware from DPA and similar side-channel attacks. In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of different logic styles against power analysis attacks, the non-linear bijective function of the Kasumi algorithm (known as substitution box S7) was implemented with CMOS and MCML technology, and a set of attacks was performed using power traces derived from SPICE-level simulations. Although all keys were discovered for CMOS, only very few attacks to MCML were successful.},
	keywords = {current mode logic (CML), differential power analysis (DPA), power simulation, side channel attacks},
	author = {Regazzoni, Francesco and Badel, St{\'e}phane and Eisenbarth, Thomas and Gro{\ss}sch{\"a}dl, Johann and Poschmann, Axel and Toprak, Zeynep and Macchetti, Marco and Pozzi, Laura and Paar, Christof and Leblebici, Yusuf and Ienne, Paolo}
}
